"individual dies." We provide a complementary interpretation by focusing upon the value that the individual places upon the commodity whose loss distinguishes the two states (e.g., the person's life) and the manner in which this value changes with his wealth. The rational insurance decision is shown to depend in a simple way on the wealth elasticity of the individual's personal valuation of the commodity.
2. In assessing the benefit of an increase in public protection activity, the correct value of a commodity is bracketed by the amount of money the owner would pay to avoid its loss and the amount of money required to fully compensate him for its loss, assuming that there is no bar to other forms of contingent payments being made. One application of this result is to clarify the appropriate benefit measure for public investments, which have the effect of changing the rates of serious injury or death.4
IRREPLACEABLE COMMODITIES
The individual's demand for insurance coverage or protection of an asset depends upon his personal valuation of the asset; its market (sale) value is relevant only insofar as it influences his personal valuation. We expect market and personal valuations to coincide for assets that are usually perceived to have perfect substitutes readily available in the market (e.g., General Motors stock certificates), but these values may diverge widely for an asset that is perceived by the owner as having unique attributes. Indeed, there are no markets for some continuing sources of utility, such as good health, the life of a friend, or freedom of speech. Although the individual may be able to assess the monetary value of such "assets" (and may indeed be faced with decisions that in effect require such assessments), his personal valuation is not tied to any market price. Since in general the individual's personal valuation of unique or irreplaceable assets will change with changes in his wealth, this possibility should be incorporated into a general theory of behavior under risk.
Consider the value its owner places on a commodity 0 in the context of calculating his demand for insurance or protection. This value is equivalently defined as the owner's minimum selling price; 145 the rate at which he is willing to exchange 0 for "all other goods;" or the minimum payment necessary to fully compensate him in the event that he loses 0. We denote this value by C. C is under some circumstances bounded by market prices: Assuming that there are no transactions costs, we see that C is not less than the market price of commodities, which potential buyers view as equivalent to 0, since otherwise it would pay the owner to sell 0. Furthermore, C is not greater than the market price of any commodity that the owner perceives as equivalent to Q.5 When these lower and upper bounds are equal, C is precisely determined by market prices and invariant with respect to the owner's wealth-this is the conventional case in economic theory of "homogeneous" product and a "frictionless" market. More commonly, perhaps, transactions and information costs introduce a wedge between these lower and upper bounds; it is also possible (and most relevant to our analysis) that no market exists for 0 or that the owner perceives no other commodity as equivalent to 0. In any of these cases C is determined by the owner's tastes and may in general change with changes in his wealth.
In the analysis that follows, we shall denote a commodity 0 as "irreplaceable" if (in the owner's view) equivalent commodities are not available in the market or if C is less than the price of an equivalent commodity for at least some levels of the owner's wealth.6 Oth-5. "Equivalence" is necessarily a matter of the individual's tastes and perceptions, since no commodity has an exact physical duplicate; each snowflake, sugar crystal, and Chevrolet is essentially unique. However, differences between commodities will not influence an individual's economic behavior if he perceives whatever differences that do exist as unimportant. Formally, we define two commodities as equivalent if the individual in question is indifferent between any two commodity bundles that differ only in which of the two commodities is included.
6. This definition would include the "irreplaceable assets" discussed in the "option value" literature. See most recently C. Henry, "Option Values in the Economics of Irreplaceable Assets," Review of Economic Studies, Symposium, (1974), 89-104.
When the market is not homogeneous and frictionless, the availability of an equivalent commodity does not guarantee that the individual will feel that replacement of () with the equivalent commodity is the least-cost method of making himself "whole" following the loss of 0. Some other commodity (or even some extensive change in his asset holdings) may accomplish this purpose at less cost. The cost of restoring himself following the loss of 0 may then change with changes in his wealth simply because the least cost combination of commodities required to restore him to his pre-loss utility level may depend on his other asset holdings.
For example, consider a woman who inherits a diamond brooch that she could sell for $200, but that retails for $500 (i.e., she could buy another brooch she perceives as equivalent for that amount). Her personal valuation of the brooch will most likely lie somewhere strictly between these two numbers, implying that if the brooch were stolen she would not buy another one even if she received $500 compensation for the loss. Thus, although the brooch is replaceable in one sense, she would not actually choose to replace it. We have limited the definition of replaceability to those commodities that both can and would be replaced when their loss is fully compensated. Perhaps the most interesting applications of the theory, however, are to commodities for which it is highly unlikely that any equivalent commodities are available (e.g., commodities whose value depends largely on sentiment). erwise, 0 will be denoted "replaceable." Note that C is necessarily fixed by a market price if 0 is replaceable, but may vary with the owner's wealth if it is irreplaceable. The remainder of this section presents a somewhat more formal discussion of this wealth effect, as a prelude to next section's discussion of the demand for insurance.
Suppose that 9. This terminology conforms to conventional usage: if a commodity is normal in the sense that an increase in wealth, ceteris paribas, entails an increase in the consumption of the commodity, then it is also necessarily true that the maximum amount an individual would pay for a given amount of the commodity increases with wealth. It is our impression that most irreplaceable commodities are normal for most owners. In fact, we have not been able to think of clear examples of an inferior commodity.
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if it is inferior. Moreover, given this ransom concept, a replaceable commodity can be viewed as a special case of an irreplaceable commodity in which the wealth effect R'(W) is zero and thus for which
U0 (W) = U'(W -R (W)).
Last, notice that10
C(W) < R(W) as R'(W) O. INSURING IRREPLACEABLE COMMODITIES
In what way will the risk-averse individual's demand for insurance coverage of an irreplaceable commodity differ from his demand for insurance coverage of a replaceable commodity? A defining characteristic of a risk-averse individual is that he will insure fully against the loss of a replaceable commodity if he is able to buy any actuarially fair policy (i.e., he will exchange any risky portfolio of replaceable assets for a riskless portfolio of the same expected value if given the opportunity): surprisingly, he will buy less than full coverage for a normal irreplaceable commodity if he can buy insurance at actuarially fair rates.
With "fair" transfers of wealth between states available, the individual's budget constraint is The individual has insured himself fully (Ua (W*) = Ub (W*)) and is indifferent as to which state of the world occurs. This, of course, is the case corresponding to a replaceable commodity.
If the irreplaceable commodity is normal (if R'(W*) is positive), then equations (4) and (8) imply that W* > W* -R(W*) or that (10) W* -W* < R(W*).

In this case the individual stops short of full insurance (Ua (We) < Ub (W*)) and prefers the occurrence of state b to state a. If the wealth effect is sufficiently large, and in particular if R'(W*) = 1 -U'b(W*)/U'b(W -R(W)),
then U' (W*) = U'b ( W*), and the individual will purchase insurance against only the financial loss associated with the loss of the commodity (W* = W*). 13 Still larger values of R'( W) would be associated with less than complete insurance against even the financial loss; he may buy no insurance whatever, or even bet on the occurrence of state b (e.g., with the purchase of an annuity rather than the life insurance).14 Examples illustrating these possibilities are examined in the Appendix. Last, if the irreplaceable commodity is inferior, then equations (5) and (8) imply that W* < W* -R(W*) or that 13. For example, a household would demand life insurance on each household member equal to the net financial contribution of that person to the household (plus funeral expenses). The demand for insurance on a dependent child would be negative.
14. A fan's decision to bet for or against his favorite sports team may thus depend on how much the team's winning is worth to him and how his value changes with his wealth; his decision does not necessarily reflect his assessment of the odds. This possibility suggests that two risk-averse people who agree on the probability of an event may find it profitable to bet with each other as long as at least one of them cares about the outcome itself. Ordinarily, a fan would be expected to bet against his own team, but he will bet for his team if the wealth effect is large enough. Before making behavioral predictions from this theoretical analysis, it should be emphasized that it is directly applicable only to the individual's demand for insurance when the probability of loss p is determined exogenously and can be costlessly monitored by all parties. Actual insurance transactions are of course influenced by the insurer's perception of the moral hazard created by certain contractual arrangements. For this reason, and because (contrary to our assumption of a "fair" price) insurance is usually available only with a positive "loading," the actual quantity of insurance purchased on the private market for an irreplaceable commodity will tend to be less than the quantity demanded under our assumptions.'5 A normative implication of our analysis follows from the reasonable assumption that life, good health, the absence of pain and suffering, etc. are "normal" irreplaceable commodities: the goal of full compensation to victims of violent crime or accidents that result in injury or death is not compatible with economic efficiency (since the settlements will be "too high"). This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that administering programs for criminal victim compensation, workmen's compensation, and other tort settlements is costly (i.e., there is a large positive loading on these types of "insurance").
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THE VALUE OF COLLECTIVE PROTECTION
The individual probability of loss in many cases is influenced by public activities such as law enforcement, highway design, and medical research. Investments in such areas produce a good (reductions in the probability of loss for each of a number of individuals) that, from an efficiency point of view, should be valued at an amount equal to the sum of the resulting benefits accruing to individuals. E. Mishan points out that the appropriate individual benefit measure in such cases is the "compensating variation" in wealth: the reduction in the individual's wealth, which, when coupled with a reduction in the probability of loss, leaves him at the same (expected) utility level.'6
Mishan does not mention what we are to assume about the existence and nature of contingency markets in calculating this benefit measure, although this issue is clearly salient; note Zeckhauser's example of the community that, because it lacks fire insurance, finds it worthwhile to rent a fire engine for $12,000 a year to prevent one $10,000 fire a year.'7 (If the community could organize an insurance pool, the benefit of the fire engine would be only $10,000.) We think it theoretically appropriate and useful to identify the pure protection benefit of a proposed public investment as its value when fair transfers of wealth between states are possible. An investment may have some 15. For example, if the premium for a payment of I dollars contingent on state a is /31, then it can be shown that the demand for insurance falls as /3 increases. It should be noted that the presumption that d is typically greater than pl(1 -p) (the fair rate) is not necessarily correct, since p is the individual's perception of the probability of loss and may be an exaggeration of the actuarial probability.
16. Op. cit., pp. 691-95. additional benefit (as in Zeckhauser's example) if the project is undertaken in the context of imperfect contingency markets; this type of benefit results from changes with respect to the efficiency of the distribution of wealth among states of the world, and is conceptually distinct from changes in the expected value of wealth.18 The pure protection benefit of a reduction in p is then defined as the maximum expected payment made by the individual, which, when coupled with the reduction in p, leaves the individual's expected utility unchanged. This benefit measure is the same whether (1) the individual is viewed as contracting to make identical payments in states a and b and then adjusting his insurance coverage appropriately; or (2) the individual is viewed as contracting for payments in the two states that are chosen so as to leave him in equilibrium. (In the latter case the payments will in general be different, and one "payment" may even be negative.) We employ the latter definition in the analysis that follows.
Suppose that an individual is initially endowed with expected wealth W and a probability of loss P-. This endowment is one point on the indifference curve depicting the trade-off between expected wealth W(p) and the probability of loss, where Equation (12) defines expected cost of that bundle (W* (p), W* (p)), which would be purchased at fair odds (equation (13)) and which yields the same expected utility as the endowment bundle (equation (14)).
18. The value of any public investment in protection can be analyzed as the algebraic sum of (1) the value of moving from the initial wealth distribution to an efficient risk distribution of wealth; (2) the pure protection benefit of the investment; and (3) the cost of financing the investment inefficiently if the postinvestment distribution of wealth is inefficient. This trichotomy provides a useful framework in which to evaluate the financing scheme associated with the project, as distinct from the activity that produces greater protection. Such an analysis would perhaps facilitate a quest for more efficient financing mechanisms. It should be pointed out that this analysis implicitly assumes that the law of large numbers applies to the losses we are discussing-there is a large group of potential insurers whose aggregate wealth is invariant over states of the world. 20. Conversely, V can be approximated as one hundred times the amount the individual would be willing to pay for a 0.01 reduction in the probability of state a.
